In the summer of 1939, Hitler's Germany provoked an acute European crisis, the outcome of which had several options for resolution, including a peaceful one, along the lines of the Munich Agreement of 1938. Adolf Hitler, with his strategy of indirect action, played for higher stakes, took risks and often bluffed, leaving it to himself to exploit the option that was most favourable for him. Since 22 May 1939, Fascist Italy had been a military ally of Germany. Depending on the outcome of the Polish-German conflict, the Italian leadership planned a local “parallel” war in the Balkans and the Mediterranean in the event that the Western allies failed to counter German plans. The study proves that the British and French declarations of war on Germany were aimed at preventing Italian aggression in the area of direct geopolitical interest of the UK and France. The author analyses attempts made by Italian diplomacy to organise a “new Munich” and the reasons for their failure. The author analyses attempts made by Italian diplomacy to organise a “new Munich” and the reasons for their failure. He concludes that the Western allies succeeded in preventing the actualisation of the Italian-German military alliance. This was done under the threat of a all-out war and a crushing blow to Italy and its colonial possessions. In the context of the immediate politico-military situation at the time, the holding of a peace conference proved irrelevant to both the German leadership and the Western allies. Analyzing the four powers' negotiation process with regard to convening a peace conference, the author believes that prior to 17 September 1939, the USSR was hardly considered as an independent factor in the diplomatic and military game of the European powers. The author's conclusions are supported by data from Italian diplomatic and military documents, previously unknown in Russian historiography.